

619 To the south of Tay is the Jubur tribe. This tribe is composed
241 of two branches, the Jubur of Jagjag concentrated around Tal Brak
233 and south to Hassakeh, and the Jubur of the Khabur from north of
Hassakeh to Fadghami. The Jagjag Jubur have taken to growing
cereals besides grazing, but the Khabur Jubur find little employ-
ment in agriculture because their area is arid and those who do not
work on irrigated lands are mostly sheep grazers.

619 Another big tribe migrating between the Euphrates and Jazirah
241 is the Baggaret el Jabal. This tribe is completely nomad. It spends
233 the winter in the plains toward Deir Ezzor and migrates in the sum-
721 mer to Jabal Abdel Aziz. It used to cross the Khabur to graze in
Jazirah but a dispute arose with Shammar Ezzor in 1949 over the
ownership of some villages below Derbassiya, and supported by
the Kurds, Shammar was able to drive Baggara back across the
Khabur.

221 Of these tribes mentioned, Shammar is still mostly nomadic
621 though its lands in the north are good for agriculture. The Tay
tribe is completely sedentary, Jubur Jagjag have become mostly
sedentary, while Jubur Khabur are in a measure nomads because of
the unsuitability of their lands, and the Baggara are completely
nomads.

619 In tribal politics, Shammar stands alone. Tay and the Jubur
721 are traditional allies against Shammar. The Baggara are enemies
of Shammar and friendly to Jubur. Raids of Shammar on Jubur are
frequent especially in the region of Fadghami. The last big con-
flict between Shammar and Tay occurred in 1951 when over a
hundred persons from the two parties were killed in a fight over the
ownership of the lands south of the Rad.

6221 The Bedouin Sheiks of the different Arab tribes formerly re-
6621 ceived money grants from the Ottoman Government under the
guise of expenses for the maintenance of law and order in their
regions. These grants were in essence bribes to keep the Sheiks
quiet. Unfortunately, the French continued this system, and relied
on the Sheiks to control the tribesmen by giving the Sheik a fixed
annual salary, each according to his importance. In this way, the
Government implicitly renounced its right to deal directly with
the individual Bedouin and dealt with him only through his Sheik.

This situation, which lasted until about a year ago, strengthened
the Sheik enormously in the eyes of his tribesmen, and the Sheik
6224 invariably exploited the situation to his personal benefit. Thus,
425 in the Bedouin districts of Jazirah, the rapid development and
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563 But proofs of their increase are the hundreds of new villages tilled
361 by Kurds and built by them in the regions of Kubur el Bid, Amuda,
and Derbassiya.

621 The Kurds like the Arabs, follow a tribal organization. Starting
221 from the east, the Koshar tribe, mostly nomadic but recently turning
619 to agriculture, dominates Jazirat ibn Amr, i.e., the region of
721 Deink and Ain Diwar. The Koshar border Shammar on the south and
they are on fighting terms because Nayefz Pasha, chief of the Koshar,
killed the brother of Dham, chief of Shammar. Next to the west is
the Shitiya tribe around Kubur el Bid. This tribe is old in the region.

[291] Its members are Arab in their dress and, in contrast with all the other
191] Kurdish tribes, they speak Arabic as well as Kurdish. Its lands lie
west of Shammar and more within the Tay region but its relations
with both are friendly.

619 Qamishli, which is a Tay region, includes villages of the Pinar
861 Ali tribe. But west of Qamishli comes a solid bloc of 100% Kurdish
villages extending for more than sixty kilometers and reaching to
the west of Dirbassiya practically uninterrupted by any Arab village.

[134] This area is undoubtedly one of the most fertile of Jazirah. Within
it, the Dakkuriya tribe is centered around Amuda, then follow the
Kikiya around Dirbassiya, and the Milliya from Dirbassiya to Ras el
Ain.

463 The Kurds are considered very good farmers. They plow and
241 plant with mules but they rent combines for the harvest. This is
577 because they have learned that combine harvest is more economic-
511 al. The Kurd is also greatly praised for his character. He is truth-
ful, honest, and upright in his dealings. He keeps his word and the
merchants of the Jazir trust him completely. He is also clean in
his home and in his dress, and though Bedouins reproach him for not
being generous in his house, his standard of living is higher than the
Bedouin and his villages are much cleaner.

622 The Kurds owe allegiance to their Agha who takes the place of
423 the Bedouin Sheik. But this relationship is weaker than is the case
of the Bedouins. The successive Governments did not give the Agha
grants of money or similar authority over his tribesmen in the man-
ner of the Sheik. The Kurds were considered from the start seden-
tary people subject directly to Government laws. That is why most
of the Kurds own and till their lands in their own right.

— 3 —

Other Secret Sects:—The Druze people constitute one of the two leading secret sects found only in Syria, the other being the Nuṣayriyyah inhabiting the mountains north of Tripoli. The Ismā'iliyyah of the Hims and Hamah district, another secret sect, are descended from the Assassins,¹ who for two centuries or so struck awe and terror into the hearts of the Crusaders, and are represented today by a few other sectarians in Persia and India. The Yezidis, so-called devil worshipers, practice their hidden rites in the out-of-the-way hills between Antioch and Aleppo and have coreligionists in Kurdistan and Armenia.

Special Interest of this Study:—But of all these sects Druzism is perhaps the most interesting and important. It is still a living force. Its followers form to the present day a vigorous and flourishing community in the Lebanon. Its learned system has not changed since it was first inaugurated in the early part of the eleventh century. The Islam of the Near East has changed and adapted itself to the requirements of the varying conditions. The Christianity of the Near East has changed. But the Druze system has been and still is the same.

The modernizing influence has in late years brought within its sphere quite a large number of the young and uninitiated Druzes. The report of the American University of Beirut for last year indicates that there are in that institution alone thirty-six Druze students and five Druze teachers. But no one with first-hand knowledge of the situation would go so far as even to recognize the existence of a "modernist movement" alleged to be aiming at divulging the Druze beliefs, much less to declare "It is understood that Dr. Bliss of Beirut will be the probable intermediary of communication with the western world if this disclosure takes place."²

In fact the outside world knows so little about the contents of this religion that in a recent session of the Permanent Mandates

¹ Arabic *Ḥashshūdhūn* = those addicted to the use of a stupefying weed.

² De Lacy O'Leary, *A Short History of the Fatimid Khalifate* (London, 1923), p. 244. Dr. Bliss died in 1920.

798 no less important an element in the common consciousness
186 than difference of religion.

It may be, indeed, that the religious doctrines to which the communities adhered were not in all cases the fundamental cause of their distinctiveness; that when these doctrines were first preached certain elements in the population already felt themselves in various ways and for various reasons different from the peoples among whom they lived and by whom they were dominated; and that they adopted the new doctrines as an expression of their distinctiveness. Whatever its origin, a sect once founded tended to become a closed community very conscious of its difference from the surrounding world: a difference which revealed itself not only in religious beliefs but also in customs and traditions. The sect persisted as a social entity even after the impulse of affirmation which gave it birth had died away. To leave one's sect was to leave one's whole world, and to live without loyalties, the protection of a community, the consciousness of solidarity and the comfort of normality.

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779 Islam gave the traditional society of Syria its dominant
181 creed, its explicit moral code and its political organization.
577 Its language and literature and its images of heroism and human grandeur came from the Arabian desert.

The way of life of the Beduin has deeply influenced Islam and been as deeply influenced by it, but the two are distinct. It is a way of life which has developed in order to meet the needs of the nomadic existence, an existence of the utmost bareness, insecurity, homelessness and poverty. It has alone made that existence tolerable and given it dignity and even a certain splendour. For it the cardinal virtues are courage and the other martial qualities; hospitality without limit or thought of recompense; loyalty to one's family and tribe; and reverence for the transmitted wisdom of the community, embodied in tribal customs and traditions and in a code of honour. The life of the Beduin has no room for subtleties and doubts, and would be wholly barren of culture were it not for the Arab love of language, of story and of poetry.

- 631 The Arabian desert produced not only a moral system, but also a social organization. It was based upon the clan and

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65 621

the tribe or collection of clans, held together by blood-relationship and regulated by customary law dispensed by chieftains who owed their position to a combination of birth and ability.

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Arab life and society were reflected in the literature of the Arabic tongue: a literature which at least in its early phases grew up in isolation, developing its own norms and methods. Later it was influenced by other literatures, but throughout its history it preserved a continuity of outlook and subject-matter and perfectly expressed the dreams, the convictions and the limitations of the people which produced it.

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The Arabian influences were brought into Syria by the successive waves of Beduin immigrants from Arabia; a few generations after the Islamic conquest they had permeated virtually the whole population, whether or not they were Arabian by origin. The popular morality, the folk-lore and the language of the people became Arabic, and the literate took pride in Arabic poetry and prose. Tribalism and loyalty to the clan or patriarchal family continued to be the bases of society even in conditions very different from those which had generated them. The depth of Arabization varies however from one part of the country to another. In certain sections of the coastal mountain-ranges Arab ways took longer to penetrate and perhaps went less deep than in the plains of the interior.

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The only important elements in the population which were not Arabized were the Kurdish and Turcoman tribes which at a later period had established themselves in the northern portions of the country, and some of which from being nomads had become semi-sedentary or sedentary. They however were not wholly isolated from the majority, since they were orthodox Moslems and possessed a tribal organization similar to that of the Arabs. There were also Armenians, Turks and Europeans in the larger towns.

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The Arab tradition was modified by the new economic conditions which the tribes found when they reached the Fertile Crescent. Those tribes which remained on the edge of the Crescent continued their pastoral life; but those which

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● 62/ penetrated more deeply into the settled land gradually changed
241 from nomadic pasturage to sedentary agriculture. They grew wheat and other cereals wastefully and by primitive methods which had not changed for many generations; sometimes using the remnants of the Roman irrigation system, but more often relying upon the rain and the sparse streams; producing mainly for subsistence, but selling what surplus they had in the towns. After the early Islamic period there was an uninterrupted decline in the agricultural productivity of the country. Its causes were mainly political: the exactions of tax-collectors and the depredations of civil war.

619 The constant immigration of new Beduin tribes prevented
721 the maintenance of a stable agricultural life in all except
221 the coastal regions. The Beduin always looked upon the settled land as a source of plunder, and gave no willing allegiance to any Government, or to any law except their own customary codes. Periodically the peasants' work was set back by the incursions of the nomads, and the constant threat of raids served as a discouragement from enterprise. The margin of cultivation was in consequence always shifting and uncertain; it moved eastwards into the desert when the Government was strong enough to hold back the Beduin or induce them to settle on the land, and when the Government was weak the opposite process took place.

621 In consequence of the change to agriculture, the relationship
427 between tribesman and tribal chief was replaced by, or rather
651 transformed into, that of peasant and landowner. Syria was a feudal country. Until the seventeenth century the lords
423 had held their lands on condition of performing military service; but later the feudal army fell into disuse, and a new feudalism grew up based upon tax-farming. The Pasha of the province was normally the chief tax-farmer; he was required to transmit an annual tribute to Constantinople, and in return was allowed to squeeze as much as he could out of his subjects. Beneath him there was a hierarchy of feudatories, farming their districts or villages on similar terms. In some districts they were Ottoman officials, but in others the right of collecting taxes was given to the local or tribal chiefs, who were virtually autonomous. This was especially so in mountainous districts like Lebanon, Jebel Druze and the Alawi district.

621 The feudatory's tenure was precarious, and his power
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threatened by the avarice of his superiors, the encroachment⁶²¹ of his equals and the insubordination of his vassals. The⁴²³ size of domains and the fortunes of noble families were always changing. A certain stability was, however, given to the system by the practice of turning lands into religious trusts (Waqfs) for religious or charitable objects. Families which were the custodians of such trusts, which benefited from them in other ways, or which by tradition filled important religious positions, had a better chance of retaining their wealth and influence than those which had become rich and powerful through tax-farming.

At the bottom of the feudal structure were the cultivators,⁴²³ who were serfs of their immediate lords, owing them a variety⁶²¹ of feudal dues and oppressed by them. The usual practice⁴²⁹ was for a village to hold and cultivate its land in common; small individual holdings were the exception.

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Sometimes the local dynasts were adventurers, ruling by¹⁸⁶ the sword alone and without any support from local tradition.⁶⁴² But often their rule was firmly based upon local sentiment and loyalty: a localism which was reinforced by tribalism and, in those districts in which compact religious minorities were settled, by sectarianism. This was especially so in Lebanon; but over the whole country it is true to say that the local community was the real political and social unit. There was no effective consciousness of an Arab nation, and 'Syria' was no more than a geographical expression; nor was there any sense of responsibility for the Government, which was generally regarded as essentially hostile, an instrument of oppression.

Side by side with the life of the countryside, there went³⁶⁹ on the distinctive life of the Syrian towns. The immemorial^[434] stopping-places on the trade-routes—the ports, the bazaar⁶²¹ towns and the caravan-towns—kept something of their greatness in the Ottoman period. There was still a lively transit-trade; Syrian wheat and fruit still went to Egypt, cottons and silks to Europe. The town-populations were Arabic in language, and their ways were deeply influenced by Arab customs; but their social structure differed from that of the countryside, and was determined by their peculiar economic function. They were naturally more open to influences¹⁸⁴

- 36 from outside than were the villages. The foreign merchants
 62 and artisans in the coastal towns and Aleppo, the pilgrims
 154 who every year met in Damascus for their long journey
 down the pilgrims' road to the Holy Cities in Arabia, left
 their mark. Thus beside the society of the desert and the
 countryside there flourished an urban society of merchants
 and craftsmen. Not only was the life of the great towns
 very different from that of the countryside; they differed
 one from another. Each had a life of its own and was the
 focus of an intense local loyalty.

- 101 The Arabo-Islamic community of Syria was a part, although
 in some ways a distinctive part, of two larger units: the
 Arabic-speaking world which extended from the Atlantic
 Ocean to the frontiers of Persia, and included Morocco,
 Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli, Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Arabian
 Peninsula; and the Islamic world, stretching as far as the
 marches of China and embracing, in addition to the Arabic
 countries, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Turkestan and large
 parts of Africa, India, China and the East Indies. In spite
 of local differences, of internal conflicts and of the difficulties
 of communication, each of these worlds was unified on a
 profound level.
- 175 Over a large part of the Arab and Islamic worlds, the
 101 spiritual and social unity which they possessed was reinforced
 by the political unity derived from common membership of
 177 the Ottoman Empire. The positive virtue of Ottoman rule
 was that it provided this political unity; its negative that
 it did not interfere with the life and customary law of the
 subject-peoples. Nomads by origin, the Ottoman Turks
 cared little for the arts of peace, for commerce and industry,
 or for culture. They left them to others, and thus contributed
 nothing essential to the civilization of the Arab provinces
 which they ruled for four hundred years. In conquering the
 Arab world they had themselves been conquered by it. They
 had become Moslems, and in their intellectual and social
 life had adapted themselves to Arab ways.
- 175 The Turks performed also another function. Their military
 177 strength preserved the Arab civilization from interference or
 even from living contact with other civilizations. In the early
 Islamic centuries such contacts had existed, and the Arabo-

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production. A reform in the system of land-tenure would also help. In some parts of Lebanon small free-holdings are to be found, but in Syria large estates are the rule, and 'métayage' is perhaps the most common form of tenancy. The 'musha' system of communal ownership, under which holdings are periodically re-distributed, is also widespread. In the past twenty years the Mandatory authorities have made progress with land-survey and the settlement of title, and with the division of lands held under the 'musha' system. But greater tasks remain. Large tracts of the country are still in the possession of a small number of landowners, who for the most part are not interested in improving either the productivity of their lands or the standard of living of the workers. The creation of a free peasantry, by the break-up of the large estates and the appropriate use of the vast state-domains, is still in the future. The facilities for agricultural credit are very inadequate; there are practically no co-operatives and very few agricultural banks, and in consequence the peasant is in the clutches of the money-lender. The tax-system is regressive and weighs heavily upon the cultivator.

A special problem is created by the Beduin, of whom there are over half a million. Their economic function is the breeding of camels in the steppes and desert regions where agriculture is impossible. They are divided into tribes of which the most important are the various Anazah tribes—the Ruwala, the Feddan, and the Sba—in the steppe and desert south and west of the Euphrates, and the Shammar in the Jazirah. Traditionally contemptuous of the settled population and of all government, in the past they have been a serious obstacle to agriculture; but during the last two generations or so the Government has made a serious attempt to control their wanderings, and to prevent their raiding each other and the settled regions, while allowing them to preserve their tribal law and organization. At the same time their economic position is being undermined by the decline in the demand for camels. This makes it easier to induce them to settle on the land. In the Jazirah, in the Hauran and elsewhere tribes can be found which are abandoning the wandering life. They take to breeding sheep as well as camels and become semi-sedentary; then they begin to cultivate the land and in time become wholly sedentary, thus continuing

619 that process which has been going on since the beginning of
 221 history. But in the steppe and desert country where pasturing
 621 is possible and cultivation impossible, the Beduin still have an
 important part to play.

162 Approximately one-third³ of the population lives in towns.
 361 There are three towns, Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo, with
 between 200,000 and 300,000 inhabitants each; five others
 —Homs, Hama, Tripoli, Latakia and Dair az-Zur—with
 between 20,000 and 100,000. The inhabitants are mainly
 occupied in commerce and industry.

433 The structure of industry is changing more rapidly than
 that of agriculture. A two-fold change is taking place. On
 the one hand, the traditional textile, metal and other industries,
 which used to supply the needs of a great part of Ottoman
 Asia and the Arabian peninsula, are being killed by the
 Westernization of taste and by the competition of cheap
 Western and Japanese goods. On the other, modern industries
 are slowly being created, especially in the three principal towns,
 Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut. Their development has been
 hampered by paucity of raw materials, the scarcity of capital
 and to a lesser extent of technical skill, competition from
 Europe, America and lately from Japan, the smallness of the
 internal and the absence of an external market. The modern
 industrial equipment of the country is still confined to a small
 number of factories for foodstuffs, textile goods and certain
 other products for the internal market. The silk industry
 of Lebanon, which was important until it was overwhelmed
 by foreign competition and the introduction of artificial silk,
 has had a partial revival during the last few years.

504 Not only the industrial but the whole economic development
 of the country is handicapped by inadequate communications.
 There is only one modern port, Beirut, which has been
 developed by French capital and enterprise, and through which
 flows the bulk of the country's external trade. Tripoli is
 important as the terminus of one branch of the oil pipe-line
 from Iraq, but it does not yet possess adequate harbour-
 496 works; Latakia is small and undeveloped. The railway
 system, mainly built and administered by a French conces-
 sionary company, includes only a little over a thousand
 469 kilometres of track. Passengers and goods are carried

565 class of importance nor an organized urban proletariat (although there are the beginnings of a trade-union movement). There does, it is true, exist a large commercial middle class in the towns, but it is not an autonomous class capable of challenging the social power of the landowners. For this there are a number of reasons: many of the merchants are Christians or Jews, and therefore frightened of coming into conflict with important vested interests; many are bound by family ties to the landowners, and not conscious of a difference of interest from them.

565 Although the power of the landowners has not yet been
177 challenged, almost certainly the coming generation will see its decline. The conditions which made it possible are ceasing to exist. Land is no longer the only source of wealth, nor is subsistence-agriculture by ignorant peasants the only practicable means of using it. The landlords have lost not only their economic but also their political function: their services as leaders of a feudal army and as tax-collectors have long since been dispensed with. It is not yet clear, however, which class will take their place. The processes which have taken place in parts of Europe—the transfer of power from landowners to capitalists, and the division of large estates into small freeholdings—may occur, but it is not necessary and perhaps not altogether desirable that they should. It is at least arguable for example that it would be better, economically and socially, to revive and develop the village community than to try to create a class of small farmers. Whether this be so or not, it is certain that great changes in the structure of classes are to be expected.

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178 Again, the patriarchal family system remains in existence, but its days are probably numbered. The claims of the family
621 are still prior to those of the individual member of it; but its solidarity is gradually being undermined by the ways of modern urban life and by the emergence for large sections of the population of alternatives to the cultivation of inherited land in the ancestral village.

178 The structure of the family is being radically transformed
562 by the change in the status of women. The change is particularly great among the urban middle class. Girls' schools have been opened, and it is possible for women to

563 problem of Jebel Druze. What degree of control should the French or Syrian authorities attempt to impose? How is the social system of the Druzes to be adapted to the needs of the present?

One answer to such questions (and it is that given by most French officials during the mandatory period) starts from the premise that the Druzes cannot be treated as ordinary members of the Syrian Arab people. What they need, it is said, is firm and enlightened administration which, while taking into account the strength of their conservatism, will aim at the same time at softening such of their customs as are incompatible with modern civilization. Such administration can best be given by officials drawn from their own great families, fortified by European advisers and modern education; it would be useless and dangerous to attempt prematurely either to assimilate them to the rest of the population or to modernize their social system.

The Arab nationalists start from the opposite assumption, that the Druzes are Arabs who by reason of their history and geographical isolation have developed distinctive customs and a particularist spirit; this spirit will only be strengthened by the grant of autonomy and may become so intense that the Druze resentment of interference will act as a permanent obstacle to unity and good government in Syria. What they need, say the nationalists, is to be given a consciousness of their solidarity with the Arab nation, into which they must be reabsorbed socially and politically. Either their claim to self-government should be denied, or else such administrative privileges as are given them should be limited both in duration and in extent.

Among the Druzes themselves there are parties which adhere to both these schools of thought, some who feel themselves Arabs and support the aspirations of the nationalists for unity and independence, and a smaller number who desire autonomy under European control and protection. But the majority probably have an equal fear of Arab and European interference, since both must ultimately lead to the break-up of their traditional and uncontrolled way of life.

563 The Druzes may be able to defend their isolation against the nationalists and against European powers for a time; but their conservatism has other more formidable enemies. The whole feudal organization of their society is breaking up :

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the small landowners resent the domination of the greater, the peasants are reative under their lords. A small but powerful class of educated young men is growing up which can no longer be satisfied either with the preservation of a closed and unchanging society or with Druzism as a system of belief. These social and intellectual processes are bound to alter the whole basis of the problem in the next generation or two.

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The district of Latakia includes the mountain-range known as Jebel Ansariyah and the coastal plain at its foot. It is in some sense a natural unit, and the bulk of its population possesses a distinctive character. In 1938 its inhabitants numbered approximately 370,000, of whom 235,000, or roughly 60 per cent, were Alawis, 70,000, or about 20 per cent, Sunnis, 6,000 Isma'ilis, and most of the remainder Christians, mainly Greek Orthodox. In the town and immediate surroundings of Latakia itself, the Sunnis formed the largest single community.

The Alawis are the descendants of the indigenous inhabitants of the district, who have endured a number of conquerors but have managed to preserve their individuality under varying forms. For the greater part of the Ottoman period the district was virtually autonomous while acknowledging the suzerainty of the Sultan; but during the nineteenth century the control of the Ottoman authorities was greatly extended. Local autonomy in practice meant local tyranny by the feudal lords, who were to a large extent Sunnis. This is indeed one of the differences between the situation in Latakia and that in Jebel Druze: whereas in the latter the predominance of the Druzes is unchallenged, in the former the Alawis are in a majority but the Sunnis constitute a large proportion of the landowning class. Moreover both the Sunnis and the Christians are at a higher level of education and political consciousness than the Alawis, who are themselves sub-divided into sects and tribes and possess little communal consciousness.

Making allowances for local differences, what was said about the problem of the Druzes applies also to that of the Alawis. There are some, especially among French officials and missionaries, who believe that the first task is to raise

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In Jebel Druze discontent developed later and more suddenly. The Druzes were not hostile to the Mandatory Power so long as the latter was ruled in its dealings with them by the agreement of 1921. An indigenous administration was established. Salim al-Atrash, a member of the leading family of the Jebel, was chosen as Governor by the Druze notables. His tenure of office was troubled, it is true, but this arose entirely from conflicts inside the Druze community. There were rivalries within the Atrash family; for example, Sultan al-Atrash revolted against his kinsman the Governor. Moreover, there was a growing movement of the smaller land-owners against the great families of the Jebel; the Druze feudal organization was beginning to crack.

In 1923, on the death of Salim al-Atrash, the Druze notables elected as Governor a French official, Captain Carbillet. He initiated a policy of administrative and social reforms. They were sincerely intended to improve social conditions in the Jebel, and were carried out with great vigour. But the novelty of his measures, the use of compulsory labour and other harsh methods to execute them, and a lack of tact about Carbillet's way of dealing with opposition, quickly alienated many sections of the population.

Until 1925 there was no open unrest; and there was no contact between Arab nationalist circles in Damascus and the malcontents in Jebel Druze. But in May, 1925, Captain Carbillet went on leave, and the unrest of the Druzes came to the surface in complaints against him and demands for the redress of grievances. These demands were not sympathetically received by General Sarrail, who had succeeded General Weygand as High Commissioner in November, 1924, and who had already aroused widespread hostility by his anti-clericalism, his disrespect for tradition and his clumsy handling of people. He increased the discontent of the Druzes by declaring that in his view the agreement of 1921 had only an historical importance, and he brought it to boiling-point in July, 1925, when on his orders three Druze leaders were lured to Damascus under pretence of receiving their demands, arrested there and sent into enforced residence at Palmyra.

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In July the Druzes rose in revolt under Sultan al-Atrash.

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312 hours, that is the twelfth part of an addine. During the
805 equinox, the local day hour is equal to the local night
hour and corresponds to a 60 minute flow of water. In win-
ter, however, the local hour is equivalent to more than
three and one-half night hours and to less than two and
one-half day hours.

In Damascus Ghouta water distribution is particularly com-
plicated.

Water Policy

312 A very strict discipline generally rules water diversions
for gardens. The communities elect a "water master," gen-
erally the mukhtar who has administrative functions in the
village and who is assisted by water guards called ghawid.
These latter supervise the draining system, control the
barrages and make certain that no owner abuses his water
rights.

Among Different Villages

312 Such distribution is accomplished in numerous ways. Occa-
821 sionally each village uses the water according to its own
wishes without considering the damage possibly caused to
the villages downstream. Such is the case with the water
of the El-Awadj (Wadi el-Ajam) near Damascus. Here an enor-
mous amount of water is lost to the villages downstream be-
cause of the intense evaporation in summer and the infil-
trations into the basaltic regions upstream. The same thing
occurs in the villages of Khasrajié and Makroussa.

In other cases, custom assigns the whole or part of the wa-
ter to each village during a certain period only. In such
cases a rotation period is set up between the villages sim-
ilar to that within the communities. Thus, the water of
the Mnin is assigned for four days to Mnin, six days to
Tell, one day to Hourné and four days to Barsé.

Modern Water Distribution

312 Water is distributed with mathematical precision only in
804 those regions which are being irrigated according to modern
irrigation plans. Territories thus irrigated with the wa-
ter of the Orontes are those in the communities north of
Homs such as Douair, Deir Malbé, etc.